We all stand together: The role of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and equivalent institutions in promoting constitutionalism by DE VISSER, Maartje
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
5-2016
We all stand together: The role of the Association of
Asian Constitutional Courts and equivalent
institutions in promoting constitutionalism
Maartje DE VISSER
Singapore Management University, mdevisser@smu.edu.sg
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/als.2015.24
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law
Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
DE VISSER, Maartje. We all stand together: The role of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and equivalent institutions in
promoting constitutionalism. (2016). Asian Journal of Law and Society. 3, (1), 105-134. Research Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1830
For Peer Review
 
 1
WE ALL STAND TOGETHER – THE ROLE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ASIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND EQUIVALENT INSTITUTIONS IN PROMOTING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM  
 
 
Abstract  
 
This article critically evaluates the interplay among courts with constitutional 
jurisdiction in Asia. This is done in the specific context of the Association of Asian 
Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions (AACC). It finds that the AACC has 
to-date made only a nominal contribution to cultivating inter-court relations in 
furtherance of common goals and advances the claim that its members ought to rectify 
this state of affairs. On the one hand, transnational judicial alliances have instrumental 
value for participating courts in the discharge of their mandate. On the other hand, the 
AACC can be a useful conduit in nurturing an Asian perspective to the global judicial 
discourse on constitutional issues. In that vein, the article identifies the most suitable 
means to enable the AACC to optimally discharge its role to help advance respect for 
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights in the region. 
 
Keywords  
 
Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions (AACC); 
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Introduction 
 
Countries increasingly conceive of judges as the favoured bulwark to ultimately 
protect constitutional rules and values. Indeed, looking at the contemporary legal 
landscape in Asia, one finds specialized constitutional courts from Seoul to Jakarta to 
Nay Pyi Taw City. To be sure, the rise of constitutional adjudication is not unique to 
this region.1 “Constitutional review, the power of courts to strike down incompatible 
legislation and administrative action”, observed Ginsburg in 2008, “has become a 
norm of democratic constitution-writing”.2 He went on to mention that in that year, 
158 out of 191 constitutional systems explicitly empowered one or more judicial 
                                                        
1 See e.g., Ginsburg (2008a); Ginsburg & Versteeg (2014); Stone Sweet (2000); Tate & Vallinder 
(1995); Shapiro (1999); Brewer-Carías (1989). Focusing on Europe, see e.g., de Visser (2014), ch. 2 
(2014); Sadurski (2011); Schwarz (2000); Cappelletti (1970); discussing Latin America, see e.g., 
Helmke & Rios-Figueroa (2011); Frosini & Pegoraro (2008); Schor (2009); Brewer-Carías (2014) 
(examining the availability of recourse to courts with constitutional jurisdiction for individuals in the 
event of alleged breaches of their fundamental rights); and as regards Africa, see, e.g., Choudhry et al 
(2014); Klug (2008); Örücü (2008).   
2 Ginsburg 2008a, supra note 1, p. 81.  
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bodies to guarantee respect for their country’s constitution. Hirschl qualifies the 
global trend towards what he calls a juristocracy as “arguably one of the most 
significant developments in late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century 
government.”3 Befitting of a phenomenon of such importance, academic attention has 
been lavished on the ascent of constitutional adjudication, and recent years have seen 
a steadily growing corpus of book-length treatises and journal articles that chronicle 
the birth and adolescent development of Asian constitutional courts.4 These studies 
have mainly sought to examine the relationship between such specialised judicial 
bodies and other institutional players on the domestic scene. Scholars have until now 
largely disregarded the interplay among Asian constitutional courts in different 
jurisdictions.5 This is regrettable, as it prevents students of these institutions from 
obtaining a holistic view of the latter’s environment and the vectors that may have an 
impact on their functioning.  
In an era of globalisation where cross-border exchanges with like-minded 
people, businesses and institutions is rapidly becoming ‘the new normal’, judges and 
courts with a constitutional mandate too interact with their counterparts in other 
States. Two modes of contact may be distinguished in this regard. Judges may have 
occasion to communicate with each other in real-time; additionally or alternatively, 
they can engage6 with foreign decisions by referencing these in their rulings.7 The 
focus here is on the first of these processes,8 while acknowledging that the direct and 
indirect modes of interaction are not hermetically separate: the choice as to the 
citation of a particular foreign case or court may be precipitated by face-to-face 
meetings with the members from that judicial institution and vice versa, using foreign 
decisions in domestic adjudication may motivate judges to orchestrate personal 
encounters with the authors of those judgments.  
                                                        
3 Hirschl (2004), p. 1  
4 See, e.g., Harding & Leyland (2008); Harding (2010); Ginsburg (2010); Hendrianto (2010); Ginsburg 
(2003).  
5 But see Saunders (2014a); Law (2015); Law & Chang (2011) (examining the pattern of foreign cross-
citations by the Taiwanese court).   
6 This is the term profitably used by Jackson (2013) to describe one of a range of postures vis-à-vis the 
transnational legal environment.  
7 There is a semantic discussion whether foreign citations can be referred to as ‘communication’ or as 
involving a ‘judicial dialogue’, since courts may decide to reference foreign decisions for a variety of 
reasons that are not necessarily geared towards establishing or maintaining a conversation with foreign 
judges. See e.g. Law & Chang (n 5), p. 528-34; Voeten (2010).  
8 There is an abundant literature on foreign cross-citations. See specifically in relation to courts with 
constitutional jurisdiction e.g. Groppi & Ponthoreau (2014); Hirschl (2014), ch. 1; Scalia & Breyer 
(2005); Halmai (2012); Saunders (2011); Foster (2010); Bryde (2006).  
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This article explores one particular avenue for direct interaction: the setting up 
of or joining plurilateral associations of judicial institutions. In the past decade, such 
groupings have become a common sight in almost all regions of the world.9 The 
article takes as its starting-point the Asian version, which has as its nomenclature the 
Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions (AACC). It is 
not the aim of this article to build a case for or against the legitimacy of 
institutionalised networking among judges in a regional setting. Nor does it seek to 
conceptualise or theorise the inter-court relationships that may develop in the wake of 
its establishment. Rather, the purpose of this article is explain why (Asian) judges are 
drawn to participate in a regional alliance and examine the potential that such a 
grouping may have in working towards the realisation of common goals. It unfolds as 
follows. Part I introduces the AACC’s current composition and identifies the impetus 
for courts with constitutional jurisdiction to organize themselves into an 
institutionalised community. Structured and repeated interactions with their 
counterparts are considered instrumentally and intrinsically useful in the discharge of 
their mandate, and the AACC is accordingly conceived as an important means to 
advance constitutionalism in the region. Part II explores the workings of the AACC. 
In spite of its function as a network, the Association has to-date made only nominal 
progress in the delivery of its admittedly ambitious objectives. This is doubly 
disappointing, because members and other courts in the region are deprived of the full 
benefits that transnational judicial alliances may bring and the wider community is 
divested from receiving a concerted Asian contribution to the global discourse on 
constitutionalism and the delivery of constitutional justice. Part III accordingly 
identifies the changes that should be implemented to enable the AACC to begin to 
optimally discharge its role in fostering a true sense of partnership among Asian 
constitutional judiciaries, and thereby help promote democracy, the rule of law, and 
human rights in the region and beyond.  
 
I. Understanding The Establishment Of The AACC 
 
                                                        
9 Europe has been the forerunner: the Conference of European Constitutional Courts was established in 
1972. In 1997, the Union of Arab Constitutional Courts and Councils saw the light of day, followed in 
2003 by the Southern African Chief Justice Forum and the launch of the launch of the Latin American 
Conference of Constitutional Justice in 2005. In 2011, the Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of 
Africa was established and earlier this year, the region also witnessed the founding of the Network of 
Constitutional Courts and Councils of West- and Central Africa. 
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1. Genesis And Composition 
 
Taiwan was the first Asian country to grant the power to enforce the constitution to a 
judicial organ: the 1947 Republic of China constitution gave authority to interpret this 
text to the Council of Grand Justices.10 A lack of clarity as to the functioning of a 
system of judicially-operated constitutionality control,11  seriously compounded by 
almost four decades of martial law, however meant that the Taiwanese Council of 
Grand Justices could only begin to discharge its responsibilities in earnest from the 
late 1990s onwards. Taiwan was not alone in its efforts to dismantle authoritarian 
rule: in the wake of the end of the Cold War, other jurisdictions in eastern, south-
eastern and central Asia too set out to democratize and embarked upon political 
reform, with several of these similarly deciding to vest courts with the competence to 
uphold the commitment to constitutionalism.12  While judicial institutions are thus 
conceived as important cogs in the new constitutional machinery, their position is 
somewhat precarious, in that their raison d’être means that they are called upon to 
pronounce on the constitutional permissibility of actions taken by the political 
branches of government. One can readily understand that legislatures and executives 
may not always be able to accept with equanimity judgments striking down rules and 
policies adopted on grounds of political expediency for want of constitutional 
propriety. Against this reality, forging ties with their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions is seen as valuable in providing courts with a constitutional mandate 
moral support and intellectual resources in enforcing constitutional rules and values, 
as will be elaborated further below. Indeed, there has been a progressive 
intensification of cross-border judicial contact in Asia from the start of the new 
millennium onwards. The Indonesian and in particular the Korean constitutional court 
have played key roles in this regard. The former hosted a seminar in 2003 that for the 
first time brought together constitutional justices from across the region for the 
purpose of discussing the present status and future development of constitutional 
adjudication in Asia. This event was followed by similar gatherings in the next two 
years, and during the 2005 meeting, participants began exploratory talks on the need 
                                                        
10  See Law Governing the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan, July 21 1958, art. 3 
(Taiwan).   
11 See Fa (1991). 
12 See South Korea’s Constitution, art. 111; Mongolia’s Constitution, arts. 64 and 66; Tajikistan’s 
Constitution, art. 89; Kazakhstan’s Constitution, art. 72; Indonesia’s Constitution, art. 24c.  
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for a greater degree of institutionalisation to facilitate their cooperation and exchange 
of experiences. The outcome was a 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the 
courts of Indonesia, Korea, Mongolia and the Philippines which provided for the 
establishment of a preparatory committee to do the groundwork for the eventual 
setting up of an association of constitutional judiciaries. Over the course of the period 
2008-2010, the committee duly prepared a draft Statute, while judges continued to 
meet and share views on an annual basis. The Association of Asian Constitutional 
Courts and Equivalent Institutions was officially established in Jakarta in 2010, with 
courts from Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, Uzbekistan and 
Korea as founding members. By 2015, the number of participating judiciaries had 
doubled, with the AACC having accepted membership applications from the 
constitutional courts of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan 
and Turkey; the Pakistani Supreme Court and the Independent Commission for 
Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution of Afghanistan. The exponential 
growth of the Association’s membership from seven to 14 evinces that participation 
in a transnational judicial network is an attractive prospect for many of the region’s 
constitutional judiciaries. Before turning to the forces that account for this 
phenomenon, the AACC’s composition warrants some brief observations.  
Membership of the Association is declared to be open to judicial institutions 
that exercise constitutional jurisdiction. The Statute does not elaborate the precise 
meaning to be ascribed to this notion, but it must be taken to encompass at the very 
minimum the ability to assess the constitutional permissibility of parliamentary 
legislation. While it is common for constitutional courts and equivalent entities to also 
carry out other functions – for instance, resolving institutional disputes among State 
organs or different echelons of government or ensuring the integrity of political office 
– a normative account of constitutional adjudication emphasizes that the core aim 
pursued by this activity is making sure that the legislative branch does not overstep 
the constitutional limits of its powers.13 The AACC carries out a minimal vetting 
exercise in this respect: it requires that the file for membership applications includes 
“[i]nsofar as possible” the documents that set out the scope and nature of the 
                                                        
13 Cf. e.g., Ginsburg & Elkins (2008b), p. 1431, who refer to this as a “paradigmatic power” of courts 
with constitutional jurisdiction; Ferreres Comella (2009), p. 6-7, using the term “purity” to describe 
courts whose docket mainly consists of review of legislation in light of the constitution.  
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applicant’s jurisdiction,14 but does not demand the actual performance of this task. 
The current set of eligibility criteria could profitably be expanded to include the 
submission of evidence – which will typically take the form of judgments handed 
down – that the court in question has in fact been called upon to protect constitutional 
provisions and principles from incursions by the legislature. A check along these lines 
would not appear to be too burdensome in terms of resources or too difficult to 
surmount as a matter of practice for either the candidate court or existing members, 
while providing a confirmation of enduring homogeneity among AACC judiciaries as 
regards one of their core characteristics. Such a signalling function is useful because 
“sameness” as regards identity, social function and performance is vital for building 
trust and fostering mutual respect, and the meaningful sharing of ideas and 
experiences in line with the aims professed by the Association, as detailed below, 
must be undergirded by these attributes.15  
The AACC is agnostic when it comes to the institutional arrangements 
governing the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction. Membership is not restricted to 
purposely-designed constitutional courts located outside the regular court system; as 
its nomenclature makes clear, “equivalent institutions” are also welcome to join the 
Association, and several have indeed done so. The explicit mention of this second 
category may be explained with reference to the reality of the models of constitutional 
adjudication found in Asia. 16  A number of countries distribute powers of 
constitutional review widely to many or even all regular courts rather than concentrate 
the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in a single court. This system of 
decentralisation is notably popular in countries that belong to the common law family, 
whereas civil law jurisdictions tend to prefer the establishment of separate 
constitutional courts.17 One of the enduring vestiges of colonial rule is the ubiquitous 
presence of common law systems in the region, attributable to the once-indomitable 
                                                        
14  Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions Statute [AACC St.], art. 
7(2)(c.)   
15 In a related vein, the AACC may want to amend its Statute by introducing a provision regulating loss 
of membership, including in situations where its board considers that a member court can no longer be 
taken to exercise constitutional jurisdiction or has fatally compromised its duty to act as a 
constitutional guardian, cf. the approach adopted by other alliances (see e.g. Conference of European 
Constitutional Courts Statute, art. 7(2)).  
16 Indeed, the AACC is unique among regional associations of constitutional courts and councils in 
including a reference to “equivalent institutions” in its name.  
17 On the relevance of the difference between the civil or common law nature of a legal system, with an 
emphasis on the contrast between the US and Europe, see Rosenfeld (2004), p. 635-8 and see also 
Hahm (2012), discussing how the South Korean constitutional courts fits within these paradigms.  
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force of Great Britain. The Association has clearly sought to cater to the prevailing 
variations in institutional design and its members accordingly exhibit a greater degree 
of institutional diversity than do similar groupings in for instance Europe and Latin 
America, where separate constitutional courts dominate the legal landscape.18 
 Not only must a candidate court possess the formal competence to perform 
constitutional review, it must be able to do so in “sovereign country in Asia”.19 This 
condition should be seen as a reflection of the region’s preoccupation with a defensive 
understanding of the concept of sovereignty, as also evident in the context of other 
regional cooperative endeavours such as ASEAN, which takes the principle of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of member states as one of its guiding norms.20 
For the AACC, it means for instance that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal – 
which undeniably exercises constitutional jurisdiction21 – is prevented from acceding 
in respect of the SAR of Hong Kong territory. It could also spell difficulties for the 
region’s oldest constitutional court, the Taiwanese Council of Grand Justices, given 
China’s concerted attempts to thwart general recognition of Taiwan by the 
international community. The Taiwanese court has not been asked to join the 
Association outright, but rather invited to submit a membership application – 
suggesting that admittance might not be a mere formality. Its justices have so far 
refrained from pursuing membership, as several of them perceive a risk of being 
asked to leave the Association in the eventuality that China’s supreme people’s court 
were to join as well.22  
A further point of note concerns the wide geographic remit of the AACC: each 
of the subregions recognised by the UN statistical division for Asia is represented by 
at least one judicial institution.23 The Association may be commended for its apparent 
desire to establish itself as a truly pan-Asian organisation – again markedly different 
                                                        
18  18 of the EU’s 28 member states have set up such institutions. In Latin America, Kelsenian 
constitutional courts can be found in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Peru.   
19 AACC St., art. 6(1).  
20  Cf. the 2007 ASEAN Charter, art. 2(e); ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia, art. 2, on which e.g. Seah (2012), discussing how Australia and the US have sought to 
influence the meaning of the prohibition against non-forcible intervention.  See also the 1985 Charter 
of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Art. 1. For discussion of the 
impact of this principle  
21 See Hong Kong Basic Law, July 1, 1997, art. 158 and the speech of Li, Andrew CJ in Ng Ka Ling v 
Director of Immigration [1991] 1 HKLRD 315 (Court of Final Appeal, Hong Kong), on which e.g. the 
various contributions in Chan, Fu & Ghai (2000).   
22 Law, supra note 5, p. 983.  
23 UNStats.un.org (2013).  
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from other cross-border collaborative endeavours in the region that are decidedly 
more modest in this regard. Yet, this inclusive approach exacerbates the heterogeneity 
among the AACC’s members: there are marked variations in political regime and 
climate, socio-economic stature and state-religion relationships among and within 
Asia’s subregions. The upshot is that each of the participating and possible future 
members of the Association carries out its functions in an environment that is quite 
dissimilar from that in with its foreign counterparts exercise constitutional 
jurisdiction. Although Asian courts acting in constitutional mode can be said to 
belong to the same transnational space and experience some form of intrinsic 
connection as a result of their official role, there are thus few other shared 
characteristics that would otherwise contribute to smooth inter-court relationships or 
induce non-members to consider joining the Association. On that note, there are 
courts that one might be disappointed not to find on the AACC’s current list of 
members. Leaving aside Taiwan, these include judicial institutions from Cambodia, 
Singapore, and Japan. While some Japanese judges claimed not to be aware of the 
Association’s existence, 24  justices from Cambodia and Singapore have attended 
meetings of constitutional courts in the region and their absence must thus be seen as 
a deliberate choice. In the case of the Singapore Supreme Court, the likely reason is 
that its justices are more invested in pursuing transnational relationships in the 
commercial domain than expend their resources on fostering cross-border links 
regarding constitutional matters,25 also given the relative infrequency with which they 
are called upon to exercise its powers of constitutional review. 26  While the 
Cambodian constitutional council is interested in engaging with its foreign 
counterparts, it does not seem to consider the AACC the best conduit for doing so and 
has instead joined the Association of Constitutional Courts using the French 
                                                        
24 Recounted in Law, supra note 5, p. 975.  
25 Evidenced for instance in the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court in 
early 2015, which includes a number of foreign judges from various jurisdictions and legal traditions 
on its bench and the keynote address by Chief Justice Menon (2013).   
26 Although the Singapore constitution is silent on the matter, the Singapore judiciary has accepted that 
it is competent to verify the constitutionality of legislative and executive acts, cf. Chan Hiang Leng 
Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209, para 9; Public Prosecutor v Taw Cheng Kong [1998] 
2 SLR(R) 410 at para. 89; Yong Vui Kong v Attorney-General [2011] 2 SLR 1189, para. 31. In Chan 
Hiang Leng Colin v Public Prosecutor [1994] 3 SLR(R) 209 the court further declared that the 
Singapore constitution should  “primarily be interpreted within its own four walls”. More generally, 
there has been since the 1980s a powerful drive in favour of developing a “more autochtonous” legal 
system in Singapore, although there have been references to foreign cases in constitutional judgments 
that do at the same time suggest a potential to engage in foreign jurisprudence. For further discussion 
see e.g. Thio (2006).  
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Language.27 The AACC for its part is keen to expand its membership. In a declaration 
adopted on the occasion of its inaugural congress, it explicitly called upon “more 
Asian institutions exercising constitutional jurisdiction to join the AACC”.28 Whether 
this overture will elicit the desired response is largely dependent on two factors: the 
perceived attraction of, or even need for, engaging with other courts through 
participation in a transnational alliance; and once the case in favour of doing so has 
been made, the comparative allure of the AACC as the judicial network that one 
ought to join. The next section explores the first of these factors; the second is 
discussed in Part II below.  
 
B. The Turn To Transnational Judicial Associations 
 
There is arguably nothing new about the phenomenon of judges of various countries 
meeting one another or taking cognisance, in whatever form, of each other’s 
decisions.29 As such, the expon ntial increase in the ease with which one can travel 
internationally and the advent of the internet as a global dynamic assembly of 
information would simply mean that judges have more opportunities than before to 
engage with foreign justices. Yet, while occasional get-togethers at international 
conferences or bilateral visits retain their appeal, the last years have seen the 
mushrooming of plurilateral judicial networks that span national borders. This 
phenomenon signals that there is an apparent need for more stable, structured 
frameworks that allow for repeated interactions and the deepening of inter-court 
relationships. It is possible to distinguish three reasons that motivate courts to set up 
or participate in transnational judicial alliances such as the AACC.30 The particular 
impetus felt by judges in this regard in turn shapes the strategic objectives that such 
associations are expected to deliver.  
 A first reason is ideological and emphasises the universality of certain 
constitutional ambitions. As a judge of the Korean constitutional court has put it: 
                                                        
27 ACCPUF.org (2015).  
28 AACC (2012), para. 4. This entreaty was repeated in AACC (2014), para. 3 (“[W]e invite sincerely 
the other constitutional and supreme courts in Asia to stand with us shoulder to shoulder in the AACC 
for protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law”).  
29 See e.g., Baudenbacher (2003); Goldman (2007).   
30 These reasons may, but need not, overlap with those that motivate courts to use foreign law in the 
course of constitutional adjudication. For a discussion of the factors that may animate the practice of 
cross-citation see e.g. McCrudden (2000), p. 516-27.    
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“[t]he constitutions of today’s democratic countries share common purposes: to 
guarantee all citizens their human worth and dignity and freedom and to serve justice 
and peace”.31 A similar line of reasoning is reflected in the AACC’s Statute, which 
proclaims that the Association seeks to promote “the protection of human rights; the 
guarantee of democracy; the implementation of the rule of law”.32 The underlying 
thinking is that the realisation of this holy trinity of constitutionalism is not unique to 
any specific country, but to be pursued across the region (and beyond). In countries 
where the courts have been endowed with constitutional jurisdiction, judges have the 
principal (though not exclusive33) responsibility for upholding constitutional norms 
that give expression to democracy, rights and the rule of law. When judges subscribe 
to the idea that their national constitutions encompass universal objectives or 
principles,34 they are more likely to conceive of foreign judges as partners in a joint 
enterprise of upholding such shared constitutional values and hence look for ways to 
engage with each other. Transnational judicial groupings such as the AACC are 
attractive because, different from ad hoc participation in academic conferences or 
bilateral judicial delegations from one court to another, they hold out the promise of 
repeated and structured opportunities for judges to talk about their work in 
implementing universal constitutional principles in their local context. At the same 
time, the claim made on the judicial association or other member-courts is limited 
under this rationale: they help to satiate a desire for kinship and common purpose that 
courts with constitutional jurisdiction do not find with political institutions on the 
domestic plane. Depending on the local context, a participating court may further 
derive intangible benefits from joining, notably moral support and authority. It is in 
the nature of a constitutional court’s work to deliver rulings that are not welcomed by 
all of their domestic audiences;35 and most judges are keenly aware of the importance 
of retaining sufficient socio-political capital to ensure that their decisions are heeded 
in the majority of cases and that their institutional legitimacy is not placed in 
jeopardy. This could engender a response of pandering to public or political pressure, 
                                                        
31 Min (2012), p. 8.   
32 AACC St. art 3 (a) to (c).  
33 See e.g. de Visser, supra note 1, ch. 2; Tushnet (2003); Simson Caird (2012); Hiebert (2005); 
MacDonnell (2015).  
34 The belief in moral standards that transcend any specific community is often associated with the 
concept of natural law.   
35 These will include the legislature, the executive, academia, (groups within) society and the media. 
For wider discussion of the range of national audiences for a court, see e.g. Garoupa & Ginsburg 
(2009); Bloom (2008).  
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given the immediacy of a possible backlash, at the expense of eroding constitutional 
principles over the long run. The appeal of judicial behaviour along these lines will 
likely be strongest when constitutional justice is not yet firmly established and 
powerful vestiges of the old political settlement remain in place or in the face of 
serious threats to fundamental constitutional precepts in the name of policy measure 
that enjoy considerable public support (think for instance of overbroad counter-
terrorism legislation).36 An important characteristic of regional and global judicial 
partnerships is a sense of transnational solidarity. For courts with constitutional 
jurisdiction, the knowledge that they “not alone” in facing public or political pressure, 
but belong to a community of like-minded institutions, some of which may have 
weathered comparable storms, may give them additional moral courage to remain 
faithful to constitutional values even in challenging situations.   
A second reason that accounts for the willingness to join transnational judicial 
groupings is more pragmatic and focuses on the contribution that such groupings can 
make to the successful performance of constitutional adjudicatory functions. Different 
from the first rationale, membership is expected to yield more tangible benefits in the 
form of access to accumulated knowledge, wisdom and expertise that participants 
may find useful in enhancing their performance. Organisations such as the AACC are 
looked to as resource facilities and information depositories for constitutional justice. 
This line of thinking tends to resonate strongly with courts that are in their infancy or 
early adolescence, as their need for a sounding board or role models is typically 
greater than for more mature and established courts.37 The explanatory force of this 
motivation for the turn to transnational judicial associations is particularly strong: 
leaving aside the European Conference of Constitutional Courts, which was founded 
almost two decades before the “landslide victory of constitutional justice”38 in that 
part of the world, the establishment of similar organisations followed on the heels of 
the advent of constitutional adjudication in the relevant region. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the AACC Statute duly acknowledges this impetus for membership 
in its preamble, where mention is made of the “need of sharing experiences, 
exchanging information, and discussing issues of mutual concern over constitutional 
                                                        
36  See e.g. Fabbrini & Jackson (2015); Davis, McGarrity & Williams (2014); Cole, Fabbrini & 
Vedaschl (2013).  
37 See also Goldsworthy (2012), p. 709, who argues that the unavailability of local precedents for new 
courts has explanatory value when it comes to the frequency with which foreign judgments are cited.   
38 Holzinger (2014).  
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practice and jurisprudence for the development of the Asian constitutional courts and 
equivalent institutions” (emphasis added).39 This development covers various aspects. 
Whether driven by professional pride or a principled commitment to uphold 
constitutional values to their maximum extent, judges will normally seek to 
administer constitutional justice to the best of their ability. By pooling information 
and ideas from various jurisdictions, transnational judicial associations are able to 
provide their members with the opportunity to acquire intellectual assets that can 
enhance the quality of constitutional decisions.40 Learning about different approaches 
to the constitutional questions that come before them may sharpen judges’ minds and 
broaden their horizons.41 As such, there may, but need not, be a link with the other 
mode of cross-border judicial interaction, i.e. referencing foreign judgments. While 
the use of foreign law presupposes knowledge of the work done by courts in other 
jurisdictions – something that membership of a transnational judicial alliance can 
facilitate – a number of factors may militate against incorporating foreign decisions in 
judicial opinions. The judicial custom42 or legal system may not be such as to endorse 
this practice 43  or the foreign ruling offers a “negative” learning experience, for 
instance by drawing attention to relevant arguments or characteristics that are 
different or absent in the home environment. While the AACC’s objectives include – 
besides promoting core tenets of constitutionalism – stimulating “the cooperation and 
exchanges of experiences and information among members”,44 there is no indication 
of, let alone active steering towards, a particular end-goal like more cross-citation of 
                                                        
39 AACC St., preamble.  
40 Jackson, supra note 6, p. 86 goes even further and suggests that national constitutional provisions 
that insist that limitations of human rights must be necessary in a free and democratic society’ 
“virtually require some comparison with other free and democratic countries.” Among the AACC 
members, a clause along those lines can for instance be found in the Turkish constitution, art. 13 
(restrictions must “not be in conflict with … the requirements of the democratic order of the society”) 
and the Indonesian constitution, art. 28I(5) and 28J(2) (“in accordance with the principle of a 
democratic and law-based state”). Other constitutions proclaim that they adhere to universally 
recognised principles of international law (e.g. Philippines constitution, art. II(2); Mongolian 
constitution, art. 10(1)) and should, in the same vein, thus also be taken as mandating the consideration 
of legal sources external to the domestic order in constitutional litigation, with a concomitant need for 
the courts to explore avenues to obtain relevant foreign materials.  
41 This is a popular argument to justify the consideration of foreign law among scholars and academics 
alike. See e.g. Barak (2002), p. 111; Canivet (2010), p. 29-30; Slaughter (2000), p. 1103-5; Bryde, 
supra note 8; Kirby (2008), p. 186; La Forest (1994), p. 217; L’Heureux-Dubé (1998), p. 26-7.  
42 Note the potential relevance of judicial appointments in this regard: new appointments to the bench 
may come from a variety of professional groups – the bar, academia, politics to name a few – and have 
been socialised to consider different interpretative techniques as appropriate in adjudication.  
43 For instance, the propriety of citing foreign judgments in domestic constitutional litigation is most 
famously ferociously debated by scholars, politicians and judges in the US. For an introduction, see 
e.g. Posner (2008) 347-68; Rosenfeld (2012). 
44 AACC St., art. 3(e).  
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case law. This is surely correct as a different approach would raise serious questions 
as to the Association’s legitimacy to do so, could jeopardise the readiness of other 
courts to apply for membership and would be difficult to reconcile with respect for 
the independence and discretion of its members.45 As a matter of fact, another aspect 
pertaining to the “development” of Asian courts with constitutional jurisdiction that 
the AACC – like other transnational judicial alliances46 – is eager to advance relates 
to the attributes that such courts should possess. A core concern is for the 
independence of the participating courts.47 By sharing information and exchanging 
views, courts can obtain more clarity as to the types of challenges to judicial 
independence – ranging from attempts at political direction, media criticism, the 
power wielded by large corporations or tinkering with the resources earmarked for the 
delivery of constitutional justice – and what they may be able to do to maintain their 
independence. 48  Even more practical is a concern with improving the courts’ 
operational framework, with the AACC having committed itself to facilitate the 
sharing of working methods and other procedural issues, for instance pertaining to the 
use of information technology.49  
Finally, some courts decide to partake in transnational judicial alliances for 
strategic reasons that are geared towards cultivating their authority within such 
epistemic communities. 50  Under this view, courts see themselves as suppliers of 
successful approaches to achieving constitutionalism and consider associations such 
as the AACC as providing a convenient marketing platform to disseminate their ideas. 
In contrast to the first two reasons, membership is accordingly not valued for the 
contribution it can make to the delivery of constitutional justice in the court’s own 
legal system, which is in fact considered satisfactory to such a degree that foreign 
courts may wish to consider emulation. Other judges are the target audience: the aim 
is cultivate the court’s reputation and authority among its peers, not maintain or 
                                                        
45 The AACC Statute’s preamble underscores the importance of the latter consideration, by providing 
that the Association is established “with due regard to the principle of judicial independence”.  
46 See e.g. Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa Statute, preamble.   
47 AACC St., art. 3(d).  
48 This could of course also be a reason for some courts to refrain from participating in transnational 
judicial alliances: those that do not take too seriously their task of upholding the constitution, including 
by keeping the political branches of government in check might fear moral approbation from their 
foreign counterparts during meetings organised under the auspices of such alliances.  
49 AACC St., art. 4(d) and (e).  
50 This is akin to what Law, supra note 5, p. 10213 calls ‘judicial diplomacy’, although his description 
paints courts and judges who practice such diplomacy as more hard-nosed: “the diplomacy metaphor 
evokes a world in which competing courts jockey for influence and prestige …. an exercise in power 
politics”.   
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improve the court’s standing in the eyes of its domestic audiences. Courts and judges 
for whom this constitutes a powerful incentive tend to be among the more active 
members within judicial alliances. The exemplar of this rationale within the AACC is 
the Korean constitutional court. The Association’s website touts this court’s “leading 
role” in its creation51 – a claim proudly repeated on the Korean court’s own website52 
– and Seoul has been eager to host gatherings of constitutional justices. It organised 
the inaugural congress of the AACC, where Justice Min gave a speech in which he 
observed: “When we established our Constitutional Court, we did not have sufficient 
knowledge and experience. With the help of foreign countries’ experience and 
wisdom, however, our constitutional adjudication system finally took firm root with 
great success. …. It is our mission and even an honour to provide support for such 
challenges [realising democracy and the rule of law in Asia] and efforts.”53 Implicit in 
this passage is a desire on the part of the Korean court to “pay it forward” and in so 
doing, establish itself as the natural benchmark of a successful constitutional judiciary 
in Asia 54  – akin to the position that the German Bundesverfassungsgerichtshof 
occupies vis-à-vis the younger constitutional courts in Central and Eastern Europe.55 
Besides seeking recognition for their judicial successes among foreign courts and 
advocating their way of dealing with legal issues, judges can act as torchbearers for 
the standing of their country and its legal system. This motivation also holds true for 
the Korean constitutional court: in an April 2015 news release it proclaimed that “By 
increasing its own international profile, the Court also played a role in strengthening 
the international presence of the Republic of Korea.”56  
It should be appreciated that the three rationales just discussed are not 
mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it will be common for courts to be influenced by 
a combination thereof, whereby the dominance of any particular incentive may also 
                                                        
51 AACCEI.org (2012).  
52 English.ccourt.go.kr (2015a).  
53 Min, supra note 31, p. 9.  
54 In addition to participation in the multilateral AACC, the Korean court has also concluded several 
MOUs on bilateral cooperation: those with the constitutional courts of Thailand (2013) and Turkey 
(2009) seek to share knowledge and strengthen institutional capacities and comparative research; the 
2015 MOU with the Mongolian constitutional court is geared towards assistance in the development of 
IT services, with the accompanying press release proudly noting how the Korean court’s international 
profile in the field of constitutional justice has resulted in “an increasing number of courts … making 
requests for assistance with the development of their IT service and procedures in an effort to 
benchmark the Korean system even in the area of information technology”, English.ccourt.go.kr 
(2015b).   
55  This can be aided by genealogical considerations: the Indonesian constitutional court was for 
instance consciously modelled after the Korean example.  
56 English.ccourt.go.kr (2015a), supra note 52.  
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change over time. Indeed, each of the reasons gives expression to the belief that 
participation in transnational judicial alliances is instrumentally useful for the 
performance of the court’s constitutional mandate: either by making the court feel 
part of a wider community, with a keen sense of contributing to the realisation of 
intrinsically valuable principles and a strong esprit de corps; or enhancing the quality 
of its approach to constitutional adjudication for the benefit of its domestic 
interlocutors; or by better enabling it to try to export perceived national successes to 
attain international acclaim for itself and its State. These rationales are reflected in the 
overarching purpose that the AACC is expected to serve, namely to act as a conduit 
for knowledge and experience to advance constitutionalism in the region. The next 
section examines the means that it currently has available to do so. 
 
II. The Transnational Judicial Alliance In Action 
 
On the basis of its Statute, one can distinguish several forms of activity of the AACC. 
Its largest quantity of work is done in maintaining regular contact among member 
courts to enable the mutual exchanges of information and experience. The main 
vehicle in this regard is the organisation of biennial congresses open to its members, 
observers57 and guests.58 The inaugural congress took place in 2012, hosted by the 
Korean constitutional court, on the general topic of constitutional justice in Asia at 
present and in the future. The second congress was held in Turkey, during which 
themes ran the gamut from the protection of human rights to difficulties facing courts 
with a constitutional mandate to constitutional interpretation and the role of courts in 
protecting the constitutional order. The selection of the congress topic falls within the 
purview of the Board of Members, which is the AACC’s principal decision-making 
body and comprises – as its nomenclature indicates – the presidents of the courts that 
enjoy full membership status.59 In practice, the Board tends to accept the proposal 
made to this effect by the court hosting the upcoming congress.60 This court also 
holds the rotating chairmanship of the AACC’s, which runs from its designation as 
                                                        
57 This status can be granted to domestic and supranational judicial bodies, AACC St., art. 9.  
58 Cf. AACC St., art. 10.  
59 AACC St., art. 13(c). Decisions are taken with a two-thirds majority vote and require a quorum of at 
least half of the AACC’s members.  
60 This typically happens during the preparatory Board meeting, which is held after the most recent 
congress to prepare for the next such event  
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the organiser of the upcoming congress to this event actually having taken place.61 Its 
president acts as the alliance’s face to the outside world and takes care, with the help 
of his or her own support staff, of any administrative matters arising. Congresses are 
not open to the public, presumably to allow for an uninhibited sharing of views, 
although press releases with basic information regarding the proceedings are made 
available on the AACC’s website. Besides allocating time for serious reflection and 
debate on constitutional topics, the conference program also typically features a series 
of social-cultural events the importance of which cannot be underestimated: they help 
members gain further appreciation for the environment in which one of their own 
performs its constitutional function and personal relations flourish more under the 
mellowing influence of wine and good cheer than during speeches in sterile hotel 
function rooms. 
A further branch of the AACC’s activities includes providing technical 
assistance to improve judicial independence, in recognition of the particular 
importance of this particular attribute for courts. In line with the UN Basic Principles 
on the Independence of the Judiciary62 and other documents on this topic,63 any such 
help is likely to address the procedure for selecting and appointing of constitutional 
judges, their remuneration, the tenure of judicial appointments and the termination 
thereof.    
Lastly, the AACC can pursue cooperation with other organisations related to 
constitutional matters. These include associations of constitutional courts in other 
regions and it is common for representatives of such groupings to attend the biennial 
AACC congress. The AACC chair, for its part, reciprocates by participating in some 
of the events hosted by other networks of constitutional courts. This, one can surmise, 
allows for the sharing of best practices and mutual learning concerning the 
development of transnational judicial alliances and the direction that they may take. 
The importance of doing so should not be underestimated when we recall that – with 
the exception of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts – the setting up of 
regional judicial networks is a recent phenomenon and that there is accordingly no 
traditional blueprint that courts can follow. In addition, in 2012 the AACC concluded 
a cooperation agreement with the Venice Commission, which is the advisory body of 
                                                        
61 AACC St., art. 14.  
62 7th UN Congress on the prevention of crime and the treatment of offenders (1985).   
63  See e.g. OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2010); US Agency for 
International Development, Office of Democracy and Governance (2002). 
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the Council of Europe in the field of constitutional law.64 The latter is increasingly 
active beyond Europe’s shores and since 2002, non-European states are eligible to 
apply for membership.65 South Korea has availed itself of this opportunity and joined 
the Venice Commission in 2006.66 The impact of the relationship thus established for 
the AACC has been considerable. Eager to extend its role and operations from Central 
Asia67 to other parts of the region, the Venice Commission advocated the creation of a 
regional forum for constitutional adjudicative institutions and liaised with the Korean 
constitutional court to launch the founding of the AACC; and it will be recalled that 
among the original members the latter played a leading role in this process.68 The 
2012 cooperation agreement was concluded when the Korean constitutional court was 
at the helm of the AACC as what should be appreciated as a further effort on the part 
of this court and the Venice Commission to strengthen ties for the benefit of the 
delivery of constitutional justice. The agreement gives AACC courts the option to 
contribute to the Commission’s CODICES database, which holds full-text files on 
landmark constitutional rulings, with headnotes in English or French.69  They are 
furthermore given access to the Venice Forum, a closed-off section for constitutional 
judiciaries on the Commission’s website, which allows courts to enter into direct with 
one another and ask concrete questions, including for the purpose of adjudicating 
pending cases. 70  In addition, the agreement envisages the mutual exchange of 
                                                        
64  Its official name is the European Commission for Democracy through Law. For a general 
description, see Dürr (2010). 
65 With a view to fostering cooperation among regional and linguistic judicial groupings, in 2009 the 
Venice Commission hosted the first World Conference on Constitutional Justice, with all but two of the 
AACC’s members – the Turkish and Uzbek constitutional courts – in attendance. During this 
gathering, the participating courts called for work to commence on establishing the World Conference 
as a permanent body. This duly happened, with the statute for the World Conference entering into force 
on 24 September 2011. 
66 It was not the first AACC member to do so: Turkey was one of the 18 countries that founded this 
international body in 1990.   
67 Since the 2000s, the Venice Commission had been cooperating with authorities in some of the 
countries in Central Asia, inter alia through the “Central Asia Rule of Law initiative” under which 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are assisted in refashioning their 
constitutional systems in line with the separation of powers and the rule of law and better safeguard 
judicial independence, notably including that of their constitutional courts.  
68 In 2014, the Venice Commission also allowed the Korean constitutional court to host the third 
congress of the World Conference of Constitutional Justice, which the latter saw as an opportunity to 
consolidate the role it sees for itself as a leader in the region, supra, note 54.   
69 “Co-operation Agreement between the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent 
Institutions and the European Commission for Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe 
(Venice Commission” (2012), Seoul, 22 May 2012.  
70 This Forum enjoys considerable popularity according to the Venice Commission’s annual reports: in 
2013, it received 32 questions on a wide range of constitutional topics; in 2012, 18 questions were 
asked on such issues as conscientious objection outside the context of military service; and in 2011, 30 
requests for information that could assist in dealing with pending cases were made via the forum.  
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publications (such as studies or reports) and the right to participate in each other’s 
meetings, notably the AACC congresses and the Venice Commission’s Joint Council 
on Constitutional Justice. 
 
The overview of the AACC’s activities focuses attention on the extent to which it is 
successful in fostering respect for bedrock constitutional values in Asia and enhancing 
the performance of constitutional adjudicatory functions among its members. This is 
not a question that is possible to answer conclusively at this stage, because relevant 
quantitative and qualitative data are almost non-existent.71 Even if they were more 
readily available, the number of variables at play is so large as to render the 
identification of any form of clear positive correlation between the activities of the 
AACC and the promotion of constitutionalism a decidedly challenging undertaking.72 
This article accordingly contends itself with observing that several participating 
judges have publicly praised the AACC for its contribution to advancing 
constitutional justice. Justice Hyeon-Ki Min of the Korean constitutional court spoke 
of the AACC as “growing into a prestigious and practical forum of institutions 
exercising jurisdiction on constitutional matters”73 and Justice Kiliç, president of the 
Turkish constitutional court, has described the AACC as “one of the leading 
organisations in Asia in the field of constitutional justice” that has “filled a 
considerable gap”.74 One could argue that the justices had a vested interest in making 
these statements. Both were acting AACC chairs at the time and may have wanted to 
congratulate themselves and the other members for their sensibility in joining this 
alliance irrespective of the nature and extent of the advantages that participation has 
actually yielded, given the human propensity to avoid cognitive dissonance.  
Indeed, when taking a closer look at the AACC’s activities, one is left with the 
impression of an organisation whose accomplishments to date are rather modest when 
                                                        
71 Such data could, amongst others, refer to the frequency with which citizens allege infringements of 
their rights or the rule of law, perceptions among societal groups as to the state of democracy in their 
jurisdiction, or the ease with which constitutional litigation can be initiated and the duration of 
proceedings.   
72 The influence of the AACC will manifest itself primarily, if not exclusively, in the judiciary’s 
performance in upholding the constitution. However, responsibility for upholding and promoting 
constitutional values does not only reside in the judiciary, but is shared with other State institutions and 
non-state bodies. As such, to be able to make any authoritative statements on the empirical impact of 
the AACC and its activities in this regard, it would be necessary to pinpoint the specific judicial 
contribution to ensuring constitutional values within the relevant domestic setting.     
73 Min, supra note 31, p. 10.  
74 Kiliç (2014).  
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seen against its self-imposed ambitions. While its congresses undeniably contribute to 
relationship-building among AACC courts, there are limits to what these gatherings 
can achieve. In terms of timing, the congresses take place only every alternate year 
and are short in duration: members have effectively two days to meet, debate and 
socialize. Workload and financial resources presumably inhibit more frequent or 
longer congresses, but the current state of affairs clearly inhibits the extent and 
intensity of developing relationships among participants. This is arguably exacerbated 
by the set-up of the biennial congresses. The themes chosen for the exchanging of 
views have been broad and are pitched at a high level of generality; and the program 
does not allocate speaking time to every court in relation to each sub-theme to share 
its experiences, indicate the challenges that it has faced in dealing with a particular set 
of constitutional issues or highlight successful strategies that it has devised for this 
purpose. This modus operandi inhibits AACC congresses from contributing in as 
optimal a manner as possible to nurturing relations among participating courts and 
increasing familiarity with each other’s work and working environment, even with 
due attention for the constraints m ntioned earlier. As for the provision of technical 
assistance, there is no record of any member court having called on the AACC for 
support in enhancing one or more facets of its independence as of this writing – even 
though some have in fact been faced with threats to judicial independence: the 
Turkish constitutional court, for instance, has been subject to fierce criticism from the 
executive. 75  This leaves the AACC’s involvement on the international plane. 
Focusing on its relationship with the Venice Commission, which offers the most 
concrete and sophisticated form of international collaboration, a mixed picture 
emerges. A handful of courts have been active contributors to the CODICES database 
and, as was to be expected, these all hail from countries that have acceded to the 
Venice Commission – Russia, Turkey and South Korea. While several others have 
made a more or less earnest effort to do the same,76  almost half of the AACC 
institutions have never notified the Venice Commission of any decisions that they 
would like to see included in the database. This, it is suggested, is a missed 
                                                        
75 See e.g. Buquicchio (2014); Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés (MEDEL) 
(2014).  
76 While the database includes a respectable number of judgments handed down by the Indonesian and 
Kyrgystan, the track record of Mongolia, the Philippines and Tajikistan is bleak with five, two and one 
ruling respectively – the bulk of which predates the establishment of the AACC and the 2012 
cooperation agreement with the Venice Commission.  
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opportunity to contribute to this collection of significant constitutional rulings and 
thereby raise the international profile of the court in question.  
Notwithstanding the headway made by the AACC, there is thus good reason to 
consider how to improve its functioning so as to stand it in better stead to contribute 
the realisation of constitutionalism in Asia. That is the subject of the next section.  
 
III. The Way Forward? Some Modest – And Some Bolder – Suggestions 
To Enhance The AACC’s Potential  
 
It is clear that courts with a constitutional mandate view the model of a transnational 
judicial alliance as a useful institutional arrangement for cross-border contact. In a 
related vein, the basic design of the AACC is surely satisfactory as it provides a 
convenient platform for more and easier engagements among interested Asian judges. 
Yet, some pragmatic adaptations are certainly sensible.  
The case in favour of some modicum of change does not rest solely on the 
argument that doing so would better serve existing members, even though it is clearly 
important that any changes resonate with the self-interest of participating courts given 
that the AACC has no autonomous capacity to make decisions.  
A second argument appeals to the AACC’s aspiration to become a truly pan-
Asian organisation. We have seen that a number of courts in the region that perform 
constitutional functions have until now refrained from joining the AACC. In the 
majority of cases, the decision not to apply for membership cannot be attributed to an 
attitude of indifference to forging relationships with foreign courts: there are judges in 
courts the world over that are enthusiastic about international networking in one way 
or another. Rather, the explanation appears to lie in either unfamiliarity with the 
AACC or the impression that it delivers only limited added value as compared to 
other modes of transnational contact. While disabusing non-member courts of such a 
belief is not something that the AACC can itself bring about, it is within its power to 
alleviate ignorance as to its existence and activities.  
There is a further and more powerful argument to support proposals for 
change. The discourse on constitutionalism and the delivery of constitutional justice 
has gone global. This is manifested, amongst others, in the convergence of national 
constitutions in certain respects, most notably in the drafting and interpretation of 
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human rights provisions.77 Also, and in addition to the creation of regional alliances 
of courts, institutionalised judicial networking has become a global phenomenon. At 
the instigation of the Venice Commission, the World Conference on Constitutional 
Justice was established in 2011 with the aim of facilitating a “judicial dialogue 
between constitutional judges on a global scale”.78 As of this writing, 96 courts have 
acceded to this organization, as have ten regional or language-based groups of 
constitutional judiciaries, the AACC included. Further, legal scholars and political 
scientists who research constitutional issues have broadened their vistas beyond the 
study of parochial questions and challenges: many prominent academics in this field 
write for an international audience,79  employ a comparative methodology in their 
work or actively participate in international conferences.80 This global discourse still 
bears the imprint of the Western experience with constitutionalism and constitutional 
justice, which may be attributed to two factors. First, the liberal democratic 
conception of constitutionalism practiced in the West is often treated as the best 
version of this ideal and the traditional paradigms of constitutional justice – the 
Kelsenian model of the separat  constitutional court and the alternative of 
decentralised review – both originate from Western jurisdictions. Comparatively 
speaking, many states in the West can boast a long track record of liberal democratic 
rule and some form of constitutional adjudication, thus providing copious amounts of 
material for analysis. The second reason is that much of the primary and secondary 
materials on the Western approach are readily available and drawn up, or translated, 
in English, which is the lingua franca of the global d scourse on constitutionalism. 
Yet, particularly in the last decade, there has been a growing interest in the 
                                                        
77 See e.g. Peters (2007); Saunders (2014b); Tushnet (2009) (identifying a number of push-factors in 
this regard as well as inhibitors to constitutional convergence); Law (2008) (arguing that states may 
amend or draft their fundamental rights provisions so as to entice financial capital and human talent, 
resulting in a race to the top and presumably a more homogenous set of rights provisions); more critical 
see Dixon & Posner (2011).  
78  Venice.coe.int (2014). Venice.coe.int (2014) “3rd Congress of the World Conference on 
Constitutional Justice,” http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_WCCJ (accessed 28 
August 2015).  
79 This is facilitated by the establishment of international journals in this field by leading publishers 
such as the International Journal of Constitutional Law, launched in 2003 by Oxford University Press 
or Global Constitutionalism: Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law, published by Cambridge 
University Press since 2014.   
80 See in particular the World Congresses and other events organised by the International Association 
of Constitutional Law (IACL), which aims to further the study of constitutional law and provide 
opportunities for contact to “those concerned with constitutional law and national or regional 
associations of constitutional law, thus developing among them mutual understanding and goodwill, as 
well as to enable and promote exchanges of views and of scholarly work”, IACL Statute art. 4(1) and 
(2).    
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constitutional practice of non-Western states to complement and correct our 
understanding of the manner in which constitutional evergreens can be given effect. 
As a recent handbook observes, “[a]ttention to Asia helps remind us of the unspoken 
assumptions that sometimes lie in scholarship on comparative constitutional law, and 
thus of the value of more fine-grained, regionally focused forms of constitutional 
comparison.81 The AACC could play a useful role as a conduit in compiling and 
disseminating materials about constitutional values and justice,  thereby facilitating a 
concerted Asian contribution to the global constitutional discourse.   
What, then, are the sorts of adjustments that AACC members may wish to 
consider to enhance their association’s potential? Three proposals seem of particular 
current relevance.  
 
A More Focused Approach During Biennial Congresses 
 
The topic chosen for the inaugural AACC congress was broadly framed, befitting that 
particular occasion. As we have s en, a comparable approach was adopted for the 
second such event, during which the themes for debate were pitched at an equally, if 
not more, general level. This makes for a relatively unstructured discussion, whereby 
participants do not necessarily cover the same issues in their intervention. For 
example, a session devoted to “relations between constitutional/supreme courts and 
parliament” could invite comments on the role of the legislature in the selection and 
appointment procedure of constitutional justices, whether the scope of constitutional 
jurisdiction extends to an examination of parliament’s rules of internal procedure or 
the frequency with which courts have found statutes not to pass constitutional muster 
and the mechanisms available to parliament to respond to judicial findings of 
unconstitutionality. When an intervention does not address a specific aspect of the 
general theme, the audience is left to wonder whether this is because that aspect does 
not play out in the country in question or because it is not perceived as problematic, 
and if so, why this is the case. Matters are exacerbated by the limited time available 
for the sharing of views – the average time allocated for discussion for each theme 
during the second congress was only one-and-a-half hours – and the fact that the 
program accordingly did not contemplate every member court taking the floor to 
                                                        
81 Tushnet & Dixon (2014), p. 117.  
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address the gathering during each session. The current set-up, then, inhibits the 
sharing of experiences and mutual learning to the fullest extent.  
It is suggested that in selecting the congress theme, AACC members ought to 
opt for depth over breadth. A more carefully delineated topic is conducive to a more 
focused discussion, by nudging participants to exchange views on relevant (legal-
technical) particulars rather than delivering constitutional platitudes.82  The AACC 
could further benefit from using questionnaires to collect and disseminate information 
about the constitutional praxis of its members. This methodology has been 
successfully employed by other judicial alliances, including the World Conference on 
Constitutional Justice that can count 11 of the current 14 AACC courts among its 
membership. In practical terms, either the court hosing the upcoming congress or the 
full board of members would draft a survey covering the various facets of the overall 
theme. Taking the constitutional evergreen of the nature and effect of judgments as an 
example, the questionnaire would invite participants to explain whether their 
judgments have erga omnes or only inter partes effects; whether they can hand down 
decisions of temporary constitutionality, holding that the contested legislation as yet 
comports with the constitution but will soon cease to do so; if partial invalidation of 
the impugned statute is possible and if so, under what conditions; do findings of 
unconstitutionality have effect ex nunc or ex tunc; whether they can defer the date on 
which annulment takes effect and if so, what considerations prompt it to make use of 
this power; whether they are able to decide that a law is incompatible with the 
constitution, while declining to declare it null and void; and whether the legislature 
can override judicial findings of unconstitutionality. Each AACC court would be 
expected to prepare a national report, setting out how these matters are regulated or 
dealt with in its jurisdiction, ideally illustrated with examples drawn from its body of 
case law. These national reports would then form the basis of the debate during the 
actual congress, thereby better enabling participants to identify and make sense of 
differences and similarities in approach. To further facilitate this process, the host 
court could be tasked with compiling a general report to be circulated among the 
AACC members in advance, that synthesises the national reports and pinpoints the 
most varied, contested or unsettled issues. Proceeding in this manner should make for 
                                                        
82 It is further sensible to select a theme that resonates for all AACC members: this would for instance 
exclude impeachment jurisdiction or electoral disputes since not all courts are competent to adjudicate 
such matters.  
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a more interesting and constructive exchange of views during the necessarily limited 
time available for each congress.   
 
Experimenting With Other Formats For Personal Meetings 
 
Interactions in real-time are a particularly effective means to forge an epistemic 
community with a shared Weltanschauung and a common set of principled beliefs. 
AACC members ought accordingly to be encouraged to cultivate personal contact 
outside the context of the biennial conferences. Doing so would have the added 
benefit of providing more judges and other staff within each court with the 
opportunity to partake in face-to-face meetings and establish ties with foreign judges. 
Even though the impression is often created that transnational judicial engagements 
involve the judicial community at large,83 it is typically the case that cross-border 
contact is still the preserve of only a small number of justices. These tend to be senior 
members of the court: official working visits are usually attended by the court’s 
president, perhaps accompanied by one or a couple of other judges. The programs for 
other events – such as academic conferences – usually feature the same judges, and 
they happen to be those that already have a personal interest in cross-border 
interactions. The personal ties established and maintained through such meetings do 
not necessarily translate into strong inter-institutional connections or convince the rest 
of the bench of the merits of doing the same. Relationships that have initially 
flourished may thus quite abruptly dwindle when the travelling justices step down – 
an eventuality that is more common among separate constitutional courts than other 
courts since its members can hold office for a fixed period of time rather than for 
life.84  
The AACC has taken some tentative steps towards a wider plethora of 
personal meetings. In the autumn of 2013, the Turkish constitutional court hosted a 
one-week summer school in which members of several AACC courts engaged in a 
                                                        
83 Some have even spoken of transnational communication as “part of the judicial function”, so Rosas 
(2007), p. 16.  
84 This is the case for the majority of AACC courts: judges of the Indonesian and Uzbek constitutional 
court hold office for a term of 5 years (Uzbek Constitution, art. 107); their counterparts in the Korean, 
Kazakh and Mongolian constitutional courts are appointed for a 6-year term (Korean Constitution, art. 
112(1); Kazakhstan Constitution, Art. 71(1); Mongolia Constitution, art. 65(1)); in Tajikistan the 
duration of tenure of 10 years (Tajikistan Constitution, art. 84); Turkish constitutional judges serve for 
12 years (art. 147) and in Azerbaijan appointments to the constitutional court are for a term of 15 years 
(Law on the Constitutional Court, art. 14(1).  
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dialogue on the theme of equality and non-discrimination.85 There has further been an 
increase in the frequency of judicial delegations from one AACC court to another. 
These efforts are to be welcomed and notably the former should be encouraged for its 
potential to provide participants with a pluralistic set of approaches to tackle common 
challenges. It is therefore unfortunate that this 2013 summer school has been an ad 
hoc event rather than, as initially anticipated, the first such event in a regular series.  
There is, furthermore, another practice that could usefully be introduced in the 
short to medium term: the setting up of an exchange program. For a period of at least 
one week, possibly extending to a full month, judges or their clerks would ‘intern’ at 
another AACC court, participating to the fullest extent possible in the professional 
and social life of the host institution. Such an immersion in the legal culture of 
another jurisdiction would enable judges to appreciate the working methods of their 
foreign counterparts in a way that cannot be replicated through seminars or bilateral 
visits, and would therefore be a particularly suitable means for the AACC to achieve 
its objective of promoting the exchange of information on the operation of 
constitutional justice.  
To be sure, the implementation of an exchange program is not without 
difficulties. Considerable investments are associated with such a policy, which 
includes, importantly, time away from the bench and the need to ensure that 
exchanges do not give rise to or exacerbate a case backlog. Also, so as not to 
jeopardise the receiving court’s independence as perceived by its domestic audiences, 
the foreign judges or clerks ought not to be present dur ng judicial deliberations. It is 
submitted that these issues can be accommodated through a combination of strategic 
planning – for instance to avoid scheduling exchanges immediately before or after a 
court recess – and changes to the participating courts’ internal working environment, 
including their office culture. Indeed, there are precedents for transnational judicial 
exchanges. For instance, the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme 
Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union regularly organises two-week 
working visits during which selected judges spent a period of two weeks ‘in 
residence’ with a foreign court.86 Reports from the participants show that they value 
such exchanges for a variety of reasons, with one judge stating that “[c]omparing the 
                                                        
85 AACCEI.org (2014). 
86 For more details, see ACA-Europe.eu (2012). In addition, there is the European Judicial Training 
Network, which is set up as a non-profit organisation under Belgian law, and coordinates judicial 
exchanges for judges and prosecutors across the 28 countries that are members of the EU.  
For Peer Review
 
 26
competences, procedure, organisation and working methods … enables one to reflect 
on the manner in which his own institution functions and see, concretely, how one can 
make improvements, not just structurally but also as regards the performance of one’s 
own job”87 and another expressing the view that “this type of exchange is an excellent 
way to come to a better unterstanding [sic] of the legal culture and the judicial 
systems of our European partners and to build up by personal contacts a judicial 
network [sic]”. 88  These arguments should also resonate for the AACC, as the 
considerable diversity of its members could be a rich asset of this alliance, but 
requires conscious investment in breeding familiarity and understanding of each 
other’s systems and approaches.  
 
Increasing The AACC’s Visibility And The Building Of An Asian Canon Of 
Constitutional Case Law 
 
A visitor to the AACC’s websit  may be forgiven for thinking that the alliance today 
leads a largely dormant life. As compared to the webpages maintained by several 
other cross-border judicial alliances, that of the AACC is mediocre at best in terms of 
the quantity of material available. Leaving aside a rather succinct overview of its 
origins and institutional set-up, one can there find the Statute; the biennial congress 
programs and declarations adopted at the close of these events; the speeches delivered 
during the inaugural congress and a handful of press releases. What is more, the great 
majority of materials date from 2012 and pertain to the AACC’s launching event held 
that year: there are no formal documents bearing a later imprint and only a solitary 
announcement from May 2014. This, clearly, does not paint the image of a dynamic 
transnational judicial alliance.   
The present condition of the AACC’s website can be attributed to the decision 
to entrust the court hosting the upcoming biennial congress with responsibility for 
maintaining this portal: whether and what information is publicized is thus made 
dependent on the particular member court. For reasons explained earlier, the Korean 
constitutional court has been principally committed to making the AACC a success 
and it is hence not surprising that the bulk of the materials on the website was posted 
when this court was at the alliance’s helm. The two subsequent chairs – the Turkish 
                                                        
87 Michiels (2011), p. 15-16.  
88 Liebner (2012), p. 11.  
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and Indonesian constitutional courts respectively – have shown themselves 
comparatively less invested in maintaining this standard of development. The poor 
quality of the AACC’s webpage, it is submitted, is in serious need of remedial action 
for both pragmatic and normative reasons. To start with, it is the principal medium for 
the AACC to make itself and its activities known to external audiences, such as other 
Asian courts that perform constitutional adjudicatory functions, non-Asian judicial 
institutions with a similar mandate and other groups with an interest in the 
performance of constitutional justice, like the scholarly community. The alliance 
should be cognizant of two important functions that its website may fulfil in this 
regard and gear its design towards the realization of these aims. On the one hand, it is 
an easily accessible and hence potentially very effective public relations tool. Put 
differently, if the AACC is serious about its aspirations to become a truly Asian 
organization and entice other judicial bodies to join, it should polish its electronic 
calling card. On the other hand, for the AACC to be an effective channel for Asian 
courts with a constitutional mandate to make their voice heard on the global stage 
presupposes a ready availability and accessibility of information about its own 
activities and those of its members. Furthermore, while Asian and other courts with 
constitutional responsibilities are rightly concerned about safeguarding their 
independence, they must also be subject to proper judicial accountability. When 
judges engage and debate with their foreign counterparts through transnational 
judicial alliances like the AACC, they open their minds to foreign influences, even if 
we accept that this exposure to foreign elements does not always or necessarily shape 
their behaviour in delivering constitutional justice in an appreciable manner. 89  
Courts’ audiences ought to be able to take cognizance of this fact. More generally, a 
plea in favour of more transparency is in keeping with the very constitutional values, 
notably the rule of law, that the AACC seeks to promote and strengthen through the 
cultivation of cross-border relationships.    
It is accordingly suggested that the range of materials available on the AACC 
website ought to be expanded in a twofold manner. There should, firstly, be more 
information about the activities of the judicial alliance itself. This refers notably to the 
biennial congresses and if the proposal to reorient these flagship events developed 
                                                        
89 But see Frischman (2016) who argues that institutionalised judicial networking will bring about a 
convergence in certain court practices and cautions that this may result in a possible disconnect from 
the court’s domestic interlocutors.  
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earlier in this section is implemented, this would mean the online publication of the 
questionnaire, various national reports and general synthesis thereof. On the 
assumption that the themes for upcoming congresses will include topics with a clear 
institutional or procedural slant – such as the problem of legislative omissions or the 
relationship with other national courts – the AACC would thus offer valuable insights 
into the design of constitutional adjudication within Asia and instances of regional 
variation on the mainstream constitutional models.90 Similarly, mention should be 
made of other personal gatherings that take place, with – at a minimum – a short 
account of the aim, participants and agenda. In a somewhat embarrassing twist, 
announcements of AACC board meetings are published by the Venice Commission in 
the ‘recent and current events’ page of its website, while the same information cannot 
be found on the alliance’s own website.  
Secondly, the efforts undertaken by the AACC members in giving effect to the 
rule of law, human rights and democracy in their respective jurisdictions should be 
featured more extensively. In this regard, the development of a database which holds 
files on (landmark) constitutional rulings merits serious consideration. Emulating the 
approach adopted by other regional alliances, 91  each file would contain basic 
information regarding the case (such as the names of the parties, applicable legal 
provisions, and relevant doctrinal works) as well as an analysis clarifying the aim and 
significance of the ruling, supplemented by English-language summaries or 
translations of the full text of judgments when these exist. This proposal is ambitious; 
some might even object that it is too radical and simply unfeasible. There is, however, 
good reason to insist on such an addition to the AACC website. Saunders has noted 
that all the courts in the region for which data is readily available “use foreign legal 
experience as an aid … in resolving constitutional questions brought before them” 
and do so with such a consistency as to “distinguish Asia, at least for the moment, 
from patterns across the world as a whole.”92 In a related vein, it has been suggested 
that the region offers an exciting and underexplored terrain for comparative 
constitutional studies, including in relation to the “rich Asian constitutional 
jurisprudence on civil and political rights, as well as socio-economic rights” which 
“sheds light on the varying conceptions of rights beyond Dworkinian trumps, and how 
                                                        
90  For instance competing conceptions of the rule of law, on which see the country reports in 
Peerenboom (2004a); or alternatives to strong constitutional review, on which see e.g. Yap (2015).  
91 See e.g. ACA-Europe.eu (2015); Network-presidents.eu (2015).  
92 Saunders, supra note 8, p. 85.  
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these interact with ideas of duties, competing rights and public goods, in liberal and 
non-liberal settings.” 93  There is, then, a clear demand for more data on the 
performance of Asian constitutional courts and their role in developing human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law. It is further submitted that the digitisation and free 
distribution of such materials by the AACC is within the realm of possibilities. 
Concretely, the AACC should liaise with the Venice Commission pursuant to the 
2012 cooperation agreement and tap into the latter’s experience in operating its 
CODICES database, as regards the information technology aspect as well as the 
drafting of the guidelines and categories to be used in structuring the presentation and 
ordering of constitutional judgments. The fact that several AACC member courts 
have contributed to the CODICES online catalogue means that they can be taken to 
have the linguistic capacity and willingness to do the same within the AACC setting. 
It also means that the AACC need not start ex nihilo: the collection of headnotes and 
decisions by a number of its member courts presently included in CODICES offers a 
solid basis for the development of its own databank.94 More generally, there is a 
noticeable trend among courts in non-English speaking countries to have an English-
language version of their website, where one can increasingly find a selection of 
constitutional case law. There is no reason not to replicate these documents in the 
AACC portal; in fact, the existence of a regional databank might even incentivise 
courts to (begin to) translate and share more of their judgments, notably when they 
regard the transnational alliance as a expedient medium to cultivate their reputation 
and that of their constitutional system among one another and to interlocutors outside 
the region. 95  One way to keep the expenditure attendant on this practice within 
reasonable limits is to follow several Central and Eastern European constitutional 
courts in entrusting law clerks with the task of translating headnotes or rulings. Their 
time is not as precious as that of the justices and by considering linguistic ability as 
one of the factors in the hiring process, the court can ensure that a sufficient 
                                                        
93 Chang, Thio, Tan & Yeh (2014), p. 6. During the 1990s, several Asian politicians put forward the 
claim that human rights were conceived and implemented differently in their societies than in Western 
democracies, calling into question the universality of a number of fundamental rights. On this so-called 
Asian values debate, see e.g. Bruun & Jacobsen (2000); Davis (1998); Sen (1997); Bell (2000); 
Peerenboom, Randall (2004b); Chen (2010).  
94 One issue that the AACC would need to consider is whether it would be advisable to establish a 
permanent secretariat to maintain the website and case law portal, cf. the Statute of the Conference of 
Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa, art. 28(n).  
95 From a scholarly perspective, the choice as to which decisions will be translated would also provide 
an interesting insight into the court’s self-perception of its performance as a constitutional guardian.  
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proportion of its clerks would be competent to discharge such a responsibility.96 Over 
time, the AACC website could thus become an English-language repository of an 
Asian canon of constitutional case law. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions 
exemplifies the contemporary phenomenon of judicial networking in the Asian 
region. The analysis in this article provides support for the view that the AACC can 
have a positive impact on the cultivation of an epistemic community among courts in 
the region with a constitutional mandate and contribute to a robust discourse on 
classic precepts of constitutionalism within Asia and beyond. Yet, as we consider 
ways to further improve its ability to do so, one must acknowledge the political 
dimension to the AACC’s evolution. Talk of comity and camaraderie among like-
minded professionals that appear to be quite naturally drawn to each other’s company 
should not make us forget that judges are also national citizens and within a 
transnational setting, representatives of their State. They will be conscious of regional 
geopolitical dynamics and this may very well influence the rigour with which the 
criteria for membership are applied to prospective candidates and how the club’s 
outer contours will therefore be drawn. When interacting with one another under the 
auspices of the AACC, judges may also progressively seek to assert intellectual 
leadership: their interests shifting from debating the foundations for constitutionalism 
and constitutional justice to thrive at home and in the region to advocating particular 
approaches in the process of constitutional adjudication. This tendency is today most 
prevalent within the Korean constitutional court, which has exerted considerable 
influence over the AACC in its formative years. As other member courts too come of 
age, or as the alliance expands with other judicial institutions from legal systems with 
a robust tradition of constitutional review, the current relational equilibrium will 
change and so too might the outlook of the AACC.  
A comparative perspective highlights a further variable that plays an important 
role in determining the pace of the AACC’s development: the existence of other 
regional organisations that are similarly committed to advancing the rule of law, 
                                                        
96  Each such translation would probably have to come with a disclaimer that it is an unofficial 
document and cannot be taken as the authoritative expression of the opinion of the court in question.  
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democracy and human rights. Transnational judicial alliances can gain traction by 
establishing ties with such entities and being co-opted in the implementation of 
concrete initiatives to inculcate those constitutional values among societal groups. For 
instance, the Conference of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa (CCJA) concluded a 
cooperation agreement with the African Union earlier this year. 97  Under this 
agreement, the CCJA will be able to communicate its views on constitutional matters 
directly to the Commission of the African Union through regular consultations; it will 
also enjoy observer status with that organisation. Besides being able to provide input 
in policy-making, the agreement further gives responsibility to the CCJA for 
designing and delivering joint programs “aiming at promoting democracy, good 
governance, human and peoples’ rights, constitutionalism, free and fair elections and 
rule of law in the African Union Member States”.98 Even in the absence of explicit 
partnerships, the mere presence of arrangements for regional integration creates 
significant common ground and thereby serves as a catalyst for strong inter-court 
relationships. This is evident with the Conference of European Constitutional Courts: 
the great majority of its members hail from countries that have acceded to the EU and 
these courts are accordingly united in having to deal with the impact of European law 
on national constitutional law and mutual influences between the two legal regimes. 
For example, during their latest congress, held in 2014, they debated how to 
transcribe European judgments into the logic of national constitutional doctrine and 
the backgrounder note identified “different nuances in the approach to the rule-of-law 
principle or different conceptions with a view to fundamental rights doctrine (third-
party effects, organisational and protection duties, institutional guarantees, and 
others” as “areas of paradigmatic significance in this context”.99 In a related vein, 
regional frameworks for human rights monitoring like the European Court of Human 
Rights or the Inter-American Court of Human Rights are natural rallying points for 
cross-border judicial contact.100 National courts that operate in an environment that 
does not include similar structures lack the same sense of urgency or obvious range of 
                                                        
97 Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission of the African Union and the Conference 
of Constitutional Jurisdictions of Africa (2015) Concluded at Addis Ababa, 2 April 2015.   
98 ibid., art. 1.   
99 Conference of European Constitutional Courts (2014).  
100 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is conscious of this role: its president and other 
judges habitually attend the congresses organised by the Conference of European Constitutional Courts 
and it hosts annual seminars entitled “Dialogue between Judges” to mark the opening of the judicial 
year where its members and members of national highest courts discuss themes of common interest.  
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conversation starters that would otherwise fuel and guide regional judicial 
networking. This is the world that members of the AACC and prospective affiliates 
inhabit. The closest regional counterpart to the African Union and the EU is ASEAN, 
which has as one of its objectives “[t]o strengthen democracy, enhance good 
governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”,101  and this has inter alia prompted the setting up of the 
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights. 102 Its geographical 
coverage is however limited to only a portion of the greater Asian region, restricting 
the ‘honeypot effect’ that it could otherwise have had on transnational judicial 
networking, or the pertinence of any official liaison between ASEAN bodies and the 
AACC.103 The situation is not static however, and AACC members are keenly aware 
of the importance of cooperation in the domain of human rights.104 During the 2014 
World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the Korean constitutional court mooted 
the idea of creating a pan-Asian human rights court, modelled on the example of 
similar structures in Europe, the Americas and Africa. This initiative was, 
unsurprisingly, warmly welcomed by the participants and the Asian courts in 
attendance were “encourage[d] to promote such discussions”.105 The AACC would 
offer a suitable platform to do so. Whether and when the region will indeed witness 
the establishment of an Asian Court of Human Rights remains to be seen, but it is 
clear that the ramifications of such a development will extend far beyond the 
dynamics of a regional judicial alliance.  
 
*** 
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